North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order When Bad Behaviour Pays

For a state that has gained a global reputation as a violator of international norms, not least through its unwavering pursuit of nuclear weapons, North Korea's determination to become a nuclear-armed state is puzzling. If nuclear weapons beget security, insecurity, and other costs for the state, how might we understand this pursuit, and the delinquent behaviour that has arisen from it? In North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order,
Edward Howell offers an answer to this question, focusing on North Korea's quest for status in the international system and developing the theoretical framework of 'strategic delinquency'. Featuring previously
unpublished and new interviews with international negotiators with North Korea, and drawing upon new academic literature, Howell proffers an original theoretical framework to apply to the North Korean case. Covering a time period from the 1990s to the present-day, and using unprecedentedly rich empirical evidence, he makes the overarching argument that North Korea has strategically deployed behaviour that breaks international norms in order to reap benefits. In so
doing, this book posits how over time, North Korea has learnt that despite the low status and opprobrium that might ensue, bad behaviour can pay.